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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
property could only be administered and sold to pay community
debts, the presumption which attaches after this 67-year period
(term between the succession sale and the present attack) is
that community debts existed.
During the past term, the court also decided the following
cases dealing with successions, donations, and community prop-
erty. They are McGregor v. McGregor,81 which has been omitted
because the decision turned solely on questions of fact, and
Jones v. Jones,3 2 which has been omitted because it involved no
question of substantial import."
CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS
J. Denson Smith*
It has been said that, since man lives by his labors, when a
person renders beneficial services to another it is not to be pre-
sumed they are rendered gratuitously. Consequently when a
person having the opportunity to reject the services of another
receives the benefit of them knowing or having reason to know
that they are not being rendered gratuitously, he thereby con-
sents to pay their reasonable value. These principles were in-
volved in Bender v. International Paint Co.' where a realtor was
claiming a commission by way of quantum meruit for bringing
a lessor and lessee together. Both parties were made defendants.
The court found against the realtor on the facts, since it ap-
peared that neither party had reason to believe that the payment
of a commission was his responsibility. A generous reading of
plaintiff's case might have indicated that his claim, based on the
allegation that he was the procuring cause of the lease, was ac-
tually planted on the theory that he was entitled to recover in
quasi contract to prevent the unjust enrichment of the defend-
ants. It is not clear that this possibility was considered by the
court. If so, it may have been believed that there was no show-
ing of enrichment or no showing that whatever enrichment may
have occurred was unjust. The fact that plaintiff was claiming
31. 236 La. 184, 107 So.2d 437 (1958).
32. 236 La. 52, 106 So.2d 713 (1958).
33. This case may be used as an aid for the analysis of complicated accounting
procedures.
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 237 La. 569, 111 So.2d 775 (1959).
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the reasonable value of his services suggests that he was pro-
ceeding on the theory that he had a contractual rather than a
quasi contractual right to be reimbursed for benefits received,
although this is by no means conclusive. The parties were
brought together by the efforts of the realtor to the benefit of
both, yet neither had to pay. However, the courts might be trou-
bled with fewer cases involving such claims if realtors depended
less on the theory that whenever they are a procuring cause
they are entitled to compensation and more on securing an ex-
press obligation to pay in return for the services to be rendered
by them.
In Garcia v. Dulcich2 the court found it unnecessary to de-
termine whether the plaintiff's action in having a house and lot
for which he paid in full transferred to the defendant and him-
self jointly, in return for living with the defendant and receiving
his board, lodging, laundry, and care constituted a donation or
an onerous contract since in either event the benefit granted to
the defendant was subject to annulment. From the standpoint
of the cause or motive of the plaintiff the transaction might
have been basically either a donation or a bargaining transac-
tion, depending on whether the transferor was moved by a spirit
of liberality or a desire to assure himself that his needs would
be taken care of for the rest of his life by buying such assurance.
However, the Code presumably renders it unnecessary to under-
take to identify the true cause in such cases, since it provides
that the rules relating to donations will not apply unless the
value of the thing given exceeds by one-half the value of the
charges imposed.3 This would mean that an evaluation of the
obligation of care and support would have to be made in order
to apply Article 1526, to which end mortality tables could be
used to get at the probable number of years over which the ob-
ligation would have to be performed. The court took the view
that no such finding was necessary because there was either a
failure to fulfill the conditions of an onerous donation or a fail-
ure to perform the obligations of a synallagmatic contract. It
is interesting to notice that a previous similar case treated such
a transfer as an innominate contract translative of property.
The suggestion was that the transfer was made by way of bar-
gain and not of gift.4
2. 237 La. 359, 111 So.2d 309 (1959).
3. LA. CivrL CODE art. 1526 (1870).
4. Thielman v. Gahlman, 119 La. 350, 44 So. 123 (1907).
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In Orr v. Walker the court correctly held that a contract
may be avoided because of fraud practiced by the other party
although no pecuniary loss is involved. Article 1847 of the Civil
Code, relied upon as authority, is clear to the point.
In Loew's, Inc. v. Don George, Inc.,6 the court concluded that
a demand for triple damages under the state and federal anti-
trust laws was not contractual or quasi-contractual in nature
bUt sounded in tort and was subject to a prescription period of
one year.
PARTICULAR CONTRACTS
J. Denson Smith*
SALES
The degree of care required in the formulation of legislation
is amatter of common knowledge. Even greater care is required
to translate accurately legislative provisions from their original
language into another. That the person or persons who trans-
lated the Louisiana Civil Code from French into English were
wanting in this respect is also a matter of common knowledge.
Some expressions of the court in Zemurray v. Boe1 seem ques-
tionable, perhaps for this reason. Creole, a land developer, paid
$500 for a two-year option to purchase certain acreage from the
plaintiff. The exercise of the option was subjected to the condi-
tion that on or before a stated date Creole pay or buy a note of
a third party held by the plaintiff. This Creole failed to do,
hence the present suit to cancel the option notwithstanding that
the note was paid in full prior to the expiration of the option
period. After a painstaking review of the complicated evidence,
the majority of the court found no basis for holding the plaintiff
estopped to claim that the option had terminated for failure, of
the condition. A dissent took the contrary view. Although the
ultimate disposition of the case turned on the matter of estoppel,
in rejecting a contention that the option was not forfeited since
Creole had not been put in default, a prerequisite to an action in
resolution, the majority opinion took the position that the pur-
chase or payment of the mentioned note within the stated period
5. 236 La. 740, 109 So.2d 77 (1959).
6. 237 La. 132, 110 So.2d 553 (1959).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
-1. 2.35 La. 623, 105 So.2d 243 (1958).
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